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1. INTRODUCTION
[This paper] attempts to promote better communication and less duplication
of mathematical effort by identifying and describing several other theories,
formally equivalent ... that are founded in fields ranging from sociology to
electrical engineering.
Dubey and Shapley [7]
How large can a collection of pairwise intersecting subsets of a given
n-element set X be? It is easy to see not only that any intersecting family
contains at most 2n&1 sets, but furthermore that any intersecting family can
be extended to a maximal intersecting family containing exactly 2n&1 sets
[1, Theorem 1.1.1].
The number an of maximal intersecting families (MIFs) on X has been
found to grow quite quickly as n=|X | increases. (See Table I.) Korshunov
TABLE I
Number an of Maximal Intersecting Families on a Set of Cardinality n
n an Notes
0 0
1 1
2 2
3 4
4 12 Dedekind 1897 [6]
5 81 Von Neumann 1944 [6]
6 2 646 Gurk and Isbell 1959 [9]
7 1 422 564 Loeb 1992 [16] and Bioch and Ibarki 1994 [3]
8 229 809 982 112 Conway and Loeb (12 min. computer calculation, Nov. 30
(1995) and Bioch and de Boer (6 month computer
calculation, JunDec. 1995)
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proved the following asymptotic formulas for an depending on the parity of n.
an t2
( n&1wn2x) exp(en),
where
\ n&1(n&1)2+ (2&(n&1)2+3n2 } 2&n&4&n } 2&n&2)
+\ n&1(n+3)2+ (2&(n+3)2+n2 } 2&n&6&n } 2&n&5) for n odd
en= and
\ n&1n2&1+ (2&n2&1+n } 2&n&4)
+\ nn2+1+ (2&n2&1+n2 } 2&n&5&n } 2&n&4) for n even.
The notion of a maximal intersecting family has arisen independently in
a surprisingly large number of contexts besides extremal combinatorics.
Interactive decision making. MIFs are known as strong simple games
[25], and are used to model situations in every coalitions is either ‘‘all-
powerful’’ or ‘‘ineffectual.’’ A game (or upset or filter) on a set of players X
is a set F of coalitions AX closed under inclusion. The coalition A is
winning (resp. losing, blocking) if A # F (resp. A  F, X"A  F). The game
F is simple (resp. strong) if winning implies blocking (resp. blocking implies
winning).
Distributed computing. The set min(F) of minimal elements of an inter-
secting family F is called a coterie whereas if F is maximal, then min(F)
is called a non-dominated coterie [8]. (Recall that a MIF is determined by
its minimal elements.) They are used in mutual exclusion protocols (to
limit access to a protected resource) and replication protocols (to manage
a distributed memory system).
Logic or linear programming. The characteristic function !(F) of a MIF
F is a self-dual monotone boolean function. Conversely, given any self-dual
monotone boolean function f, the preimage f (&1)(True) is a MIF. (This is
related to Dedekind’s problem [6] of enumerating all monotone boolean
functions.)
Category theory. The ipsodual elements of the free distributive lattice
[24] and the elements of the free median set [21] generated by X corre-
spond to MIF’s.
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Social science. Arrow’s impossibility theorem [2] states that nondictatorial,
unanimous social choice functions independent of irrelevant alternatives
exist only when the public faces at most two choices. Using a MIF to
determine winning coalitions gives an effective voting scheme when there
are exactly two choices [10].
Graph theory. A coloring of a hypergraph is an assignment of colors to
vertices such that each nontrivial edge contains at least two colors. The
minimal sets of a MIF can be regarded as the edges of a critical tripartite
hypergraph H. That is to say, H is 3-colorable, and if any edge is removed
from H then it would be 2-colorable.
Reliability theory. Games are thought of as semi-coherent structure
functions [11, 22].
...
Each rediscovery of a theory gives birth to alternate notation and termi-
nology. An attempt has been made here to choose a consistent terminology
which makes our results as clear as possible. The above references are useful
in adapting our results to other fields of interest.
In Section 2, we define homomorphisms or quotients of MIFs. Voters in
the same orbit of the automorphism group of a MIF can be said to play
the equivalent roles when the MIF is thought of as a voting system.
This notion of equivalence is used in Section 3 as a measure of fairness.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the enumeration of MIFs whose
automorphism groups act transitively on the set of voters, so that all voters
play the same role.
In Section 4, we enumerate all 207,650,662,008 transitive MIFs on up to
12 voters. For completeness, we survey previous results on MIFs with up
to 7 voters before giving the classification of larger MIFs. Such a list is
important in applications, since the ‘‘best’’ transitive MIF can be selected
from it, depending upon your personal criteria that define what is best [3, 8].
Finally in Section 5, we explain the search techniques used in our research.
We believe that similar techniques can be helpful in the enumeration of other
combinatorial objects according to their symmetries.
2. QUOTIENTS AND ISOMORPHISMS
Let F be a MIF on X, and let _: X  Y be some function. It is easy to
define the quotient voting scheme _(F)=[AY : _(&1)(A) # F]. Note that
min(_(F)) is equal to _(min(F)) in the usual sense.
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Proposition 1. Let F be a MIF on X, and let _: X  Y be some function.
Then _(F) is a MIF on Y.
Proof. _&1 is a monotone function from 2X to 2Y, thus _(F) is a game.
Suppose A # _(F). Then _(&1)(A) # F. Hence, _(&1)(Y&A)=X&_(&1)(A)
 F. Thus, Y&A  _(F), so _(F) is simple.
Similarly, suppose B  _(F). Then _(&1)(B)  F. Hence, _ (&1)(Y&A)=
X&_(&1)(A) # F. Thus, Y&A # _(F), so _(F) is strong. K
X can be thought of as a set of offices and Y as a set of voters. _
describes which offices are held by which voters. If _ is non-surjective, then
certain voters will hold no office, and thus are powerless (dummies). If _ is
non-injective, then certain voters will combine the functions of several
offices. The single vote of each such voter is then taken into account as the
vote of each of his offices.
If _ is bijective, then F and _(F) are said to be isomorphic. Furthermore,
if F=_(F), then _ is said to be an automorphism of F. An automorphism
is a permutation of X taking winning sets into winning sets.
Let Aut(F) be the set of automorphisms of F.
Theorem 2. Let F be a MIF on X. Then Aut(F) is a permutation group
of X.
Proof. Observe that {(_(F))=({ b _)(F). Thus, the composition of
two automorphisms or the inverse of an automorphism is again an
automorphism. K
A permutation group containing only one permutation (the identity) is
said to be trivial. For large n, most MIFs have trivial automorphism
groups.
Theorem 3. Let bn be the number of MIFs with trivial automorphism
groups on an n-element set. (bn n! is the number of isomorphism classes of
such MIFs.) Then the fraction of MIFs (resp. isomorphism classes of MIFs)
with trivial automorphsim groups tends to 1 as n tends to infinity.
lim
n  
bn
an
=1, lim
n  
bn n!
a~ n
=1.
Sketch of proof. From [15], we recall that all but a vanishingly small
fraction of all MIFs have all but a vanishingly small fraction of their
minimal sets of cardinality n2 for n even. That is, for all =<1 there is an
N such that for n>N, over =an MIFs on an n element set have over 1&=
of their minimal sets of cardinality n2.
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The ( nn2) such sets are divided by a non-trivial permutation group G into
a number of orbits not exceeding
cn=\n&2n2 ++\
n&2
(n2)&2++\
n&2
(n2)&1+
=\ nn2+&\
n&2
(n2)&1+
=t
3
4 \
n
n2+ . (1)
For n even, the orbits form complementary pairs (otherwise there is no MIF
with automorphism group G) and we must choose one orbit from each
such pair. Thus, the logarithm (base two) of the number of MIFs with
automorphism group G is asymptotically bounded by 38 (
n
n2) whereas
log2 ant 12 ( nn2).
For n odd, all but a vanishingly small fraction of MIFs have all their sets
of cardinality at least i=(n&1)2 and at most ( ni ) 2
&n2 sets of cardinality
exactly i. In fact these MIFs are uniquely determined by their sets of car-
dinality i. As above, the ( ni ) such sets are divided by a non-trivial permutation
group G into at most about 34 (
n
i ) orbits. Hence, log2 bnlog2 an is asymptoti-
cally bounded by
\34+
( ni ) 2&n2
<<1. K
It is difficult to find such examples for small n. For n6, the only example
is the trivial one-voter MIF. Nonetheless, already for n=7, there are 498,960
MIFs with trivial automorphism groups. They can be divided into 99
TABLE II
Weighted Majority Games with Trivial Automorphism
Group and up to Seven Voters
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 Quota l
1 1 1
8 6 5 4 3 2 1 15 155
9 7 5 4 3 2 1 16 78
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 18 299
Note. v1: Number of votes to be cast by player i;
Quota: Number of votes needed to win; l: Line number
in [13, Tables 2, 3].
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automorphism classes and constitute over 350 of the seven-voter MIFs
[3]. Three of the 99 classes involve weighted majority games (or thresh-
hold functions or quota games) [13]. (See Table II and Section 4.1).)
Such MIFs are maximally unfair in the sense that no two voters play the
same role. That is, each element of X is in a separate orbit under the action
of the permutation group Aut(F).
Conversely, if all of the elements of X are in the same orbit, then Aut(F)
is a transitive subgroup of Sym(X ), and we will say that F is a transitive
MIF (or fair game or homogeneous game).
3. FAIRNESS
Depending on the interpretation chosen, different measures of fairness
are appropriate.
v In a democratic country, each voter should play the same role in
the system of vote adopted.
v In a game, each player should have the same possibilities of winning.
v In a distributed system, load should be equally divided among all
of the processors.
One might require:
v (Regularity [5].) All voters belong to the same number of winning
coalitions.
v (Equal Banzhaf index [7].) All voters belong to the same number
of minimal winning coalitions.
v (Equal ShapleyShubik index [7].) All voters have an equal prob-
ability of being the pivot voter given a random alignment of the voters in
order of their enthusiasm for a proposal under consideration.
However, we will retain the notion of transitivity as a measure of ‘‘fairness’’
since it is stricter than any of the others mentioned above.
The main result of this paper is the enumeration of all transitive MIFs
for n<13. Such a list is important in applications, since the ‘‘best’’ tran-
sitive MIF can be selected from it, depending upon your personal criteria
that define what is best [3, 8].
Since a permutation group on a set X is defined to be k-transitive (kn)
if it acts transitively on the set of k-tuples of distinct elements of X, we can
go further and discuss k-transitive MIFs. Presumably, a k-transitive MIF
is somehow more ‘‘fair’’ than a 1-transitive MIF, since it does not distinguish
among k-tuples of players.
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However, the natural object of study is not k-tuples of players, but rather
coalitions, that is, unordered sets of players. We will therefore define a
permutation group on X to be k-homogeneous (kn) if it acts transitively
on the set ( Xj )=[AX : |A|= j ] of j element subsets of X for each j
(0 jk).
Proposition 4. Let G be a permutation group on X. ( |X |=n.)
1. If G is k-transitive, then it is also k-homogeneous.
2. If G is w n2x-homogeneous, then G is n-homogeneous.
Proof. 1. Let (x1 , ..., xk) and ( y1 , ..., yk) be k-tuples of distinct
elements of X. By hypothesis, there exists _ # G such that _x i= yi . Thus,
_[x1 , ..., xk]=_[ y1 , ..., yk].
2. If _A=B, then _(X&A)=X&B. Thus, if G acts transitively on
( Xj ), then it also acts transitively on (
X
n& j ). K
Several authors have studied the set A of numbers of voters n such that
there exists a transitive MIF. One might think that there is no such game
having an even number of players; however, see below for explicit examples
in the cases n=6 (Section 4.2) and n=10 (Section 4.5).
See Table III for a list of (possible) non-elements of A. The first few
values of n whose membership in A is still in doubt are 40, 72, 80, and 88.
TABLE III
Values of n for Which There Are (or Might Be) No Transitive MIF on an
n-Element Set. (n=c2k with c odd.)
c 2c 4c 8c 16c 32c 64c } } } c2k
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 } } } 2k for all k1
3 12 24 48 96 192 } } } 3 } 2k for all k2
5 40? 80? 160? 320? } } }
7 224? 448? } } }
9 72? 144? 288? 576? } } }
11 88? 176? 352? 704? } } }
13 104? 208? 416? 832? } } }
15 480? 960? } } }
17 136? 272? 544? 1088? } } }
19 152? 304? 608? 1216? } } }
21 1344? } } }
23 368? 736? 1472? } } }
25 800? 1600? } } }
27 432? 864? 1728? } } }
29 232? 464? 928? 1856? } } }
31 15872? } } }
393VOTING FAIRLY
Theorem 5. 1. [14, I: Lemma 1] n # A if and only if there is a transitive
permutation group of degree n containing no fixed-point free 2-element.
2. [5] A is multiplicatively closed.
3. [5] A contains all non-multiples of 8 (with the exception of 2, 4,
and 12)
4. [5] A has density 1.
4. EXAMPLES OF TRANSITIVE MIFs
4.1. Democracy
One of the simplest ways to define a MIF is to attribute weights to each
of the voters w: X  N. A coalition wins if its total weight is greater than
the total weight of its complement.
A # Sw if and only if :
a # A
w(a)> 12 :
v # V
w(v).
To enforce duality, the total weight can be taken to be odd.
For n odd, we have the true democracy
Demn=[1 1 1 } } } 1
n
] (n+1)2
=[AX : |A|>n2].
Note that the weights are not uniquely defined by the MIF. For example,
the weights [1, 1, 1]2 and [2, 2, 1]3 both give the democratic voting
scheme Dem3 .
Note however the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let w: V  X be a weight function. Then there are alter-
native weight functions w$: V  N constant on all orbits of Aut(Sw), and zero
on all dummies such that Sw=Sw$ .
Conversely, if w(a)=w(b), then a and b lie in the same orbit of Sw , and
if w(a)=0, then a is a dummy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, the weight of all dummies is 0. Let Aut(S)
Sym(V ) be the automorphism group of S. Then w$(v)= g # Aut(S) w(g(v))
is the required weight function.
The converse is evident. K
Clearly, the democracy has the full group of symmetries Aut(Demn)=Sn .
Moreover, we have the following results.
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TABLE IV
Transitive MIFs for n13
n an a~ n tn t~ n min(|A| )
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 0 0
3 4 2 1 1 2
4 12 3 0 0
5 81 7 1 1 3
6 2 646 30 12 1 3
7 1 422 564 716 31 2 34
8 229 809 982 112 0 0
9 t9_1023 570 361 24 45
10 t3_1040 1 441 440 28 45
11 t6_1080 207 648 650 161 57 259 4?6
12 t5_10143 0 0
13 t5_10286 47
Note. an: Number of maximal intersecting families on an n-element set; a~ n: number of
isomorphism classes of maximal intersecting families on an n-element set; tn: number of trans-
itive maximal intersecting families on an n-element set; t~ n: number of isomorphism classes of
transitive maximal intersecting families on an n-element set; min( |A| ): minimal number of
elements in a winning coalition of a transitive MIF.
Corollary 7. Demn is the only transitive strong simple weighted MIF.
Proof. By Proposition 6, we must be able to assign the same weight to
all voters. K
Proposition 8. Demn is the only MIF whose automorphism group is
(n&1)2-homogeneous.
Proof. Suppose Aut(F) is (n&1)2-homogeneous. Then by Proposi-
tion 4, F is n-transitive. Thus, all sets of equal cardinality lie in the same
orbit. Since there must be at least one winning coalition of (n+1)2 elements,
they are all winning. K
Proposition 9. Every strong simple majority game is a quotient of Demn
for some n.
Proof. Let F=[v1 v2 } } } vk]q be a strong simple majority game. Con-
sider the set X=[(i, j ): 1ik, 1 jvi] and the function f : (i, j ) [ i.
Then F is the quotient of democracy on X with the function f. K
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TABLE V
List of Transitive MIFs: Part I (n9)
n l MWC Name t t$ Aut(F) Generators *
1 1 a Dem1=Dict1 1 1 S1 1
3 2 ab Dem3 3 3 3T2=S3 (abc), (ab) 1
5 7 abc Dem5 5 5 5T5=S5 (abcde), (ab) 1
6 30 abc Icos 2 2 6T12=L(2, 5) (abcde), (af )(bd ) 12
7 716 abcd Dem7 7 7 7T5=S7 (abcdefg)(ab) 1
7 713 abd Fano 2 2 7T7=L(3, 2) (abcdefg)(bc)(dg) 30
Total 31
Note. n: Number of voters. n=|X |; l: Line number in [4, Tables 2, 3]; MCW: A list of
representatives of the orbits of the set of minimal winning minority coalitions under the action
of Aut(F); Name: Notation used to denote F; t: Degree of transitivity of Aut(F); t$ Degree
of homogeneity of Aut(F); Aut( F ): Designation of the automorphism group of F using the
notation of [4] and any common name (see Table VI); Generators: A minimal set of gener-
ators of the group Aut(F); *: The number of MIF on X which are isomorphic to F (only
one MIF is listed for each isomorphism class).
4.2. n=6: Icosahedral MIF
As part of the enumeration of six-player games, Gurk and Isbell [9]
discovered a transitive MIF which they described by its minimal winning
coalitions:
Icos=[abc, acf, aef, ade, abd, bce, cef, bef, cde, bdf ].
Icos is the smallest transitive MIF on an even number of voters. Note that
all majority coalitions are winning and all minority coalitions are losing.
TABLE VI
Groups Appearing in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX
Sn Symmetric group
L(2, q) Group of rational linear maps on a q-element field
L(3, q) Group of invertible 3_3 matrices over a q-element field
Cn Cyclic group
D2n Dihedral group
An Alternating group
M11 Matthieu group
G_H Direct product of groups G and H
G " H Wreath product of G and H
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FIG. 1. Transitive MIF: Aut(F)=6T12 (icosahedral symmetry).
A more intuitive characterization which highlights the 2-transitivity of
the underlying automorphism group was found by Dmitri Zvonkin. Consider
an icosahedron and identify opposite vertices (the resulting map is K6 drawn
on the projective plane!). Define the voting scheme Icos to be the collection of
all sets of vertices which includes a face. It is easy to see that Icos is a MIF.
Since the icosahedron is a platonic solid, Aut(Icos) acts transitively on the
edges of the icosahedron; that is, Aut(Icos) is 2-transitive.
4.3. n=7: Fano MIF
Let Pk be a projective plane of order k on a set X ( |X |=k2+k+1). We can
define an intersecting family consisting of all collections of points which
include a line
FPk=[AX : _l # P such that lA].
This projective plane is not maximal unless k=2 [23, Theorem 1], in which
case F=P2 is the Fano plane. Any two points in a projective plane determine
a line, and all lines are mapped to each other by the automorphism group
L(3, 2). Thus, F is 2-transitive.
For k>2, FP can be extended to a transitive MIF in a number of ways (for
example, by including all sets with over half the elements whose complement
does not contain a line). These transitive MIFs are distinguished by the fact
that they have minimal winning coalitions containing as few as a elements
where n=a2&a+1. More precisely, we have the following result:
Proposition 10 ([5, Theorem 3.a]). Let F be a transitive MIF on n
voters.
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FIG. 2. Transitive MIF: Aut(F)=7T5.
(n>1) Let a=minA # F |A|. Then
a1+\- n.
Proof. Let A # F. Consider the orbit of A under the action of Aut(F).
What is the average size E of the intersection of two sets in this orbit?
On one hand, E is at least one, F is an intersecting set, so all pairs of
sets intersect. Actually, E>1, since A _ A>1. On the other hand, E must
be exactly a_(an) since each of the a members of A is mapped equally
often to each of the n members of X.)
Hence, a an>1 and a>- n. K
4.4. n=9
4.4.1. New results. All of the transitive MIFs mentioned above had
already been known prior to our work. For n=8, there are no transitive
MIFs. (Any MIF on 8 voters includes 35 winning 4-element coalitions. To
be transitive, each voter would have to be a member of exactly 35_48=
17.5 of them, which is of course impossible.
Thus, the transitive MIFs for n=9 listed in Table VII represent our first
new results. (See Table VII for legend.)
For example, we see that there is a single MIF F with Aut(F)=9T8,
where 9T8 is the 8th transitive permutation group on 9 letters listed in
[4]. To determine the winning coalitions in F, we consult the column
‘‘MWC.’’ In this column it is indicated that C=[a, d, e, h] is a minimal
winning coalition. Acting the group 9T8 on C, we find that the entire orbit
[C]=[adeh, afgi, bdeg, acfg, cefh, befi, acdi, bdgh, adfi, aegi,
bfhi, bcei, cehi, bcfh, cdfg, cdgi, abch, abeg]
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TABLE VII
List of transitive MIFs: Part II (n=9)
MWC Name t t$ Aut(F) Generators *
See Figure 3 for 1 1 9T1=C9 (aehbficdg) 10_40,320
10 missing lines
aefg 1 1 9T3=D18 (aehbficdg) 20,160
(ah)(bg)(ci )(df )
dghi 1 1 9T3=D18 (aehbficdg) 20,160
(ah)(bg)(ci )(df )
See Figure 5 for 1 1 9T4=C3_S3 (adg)(beh)(cfi) 5_20,160
5 missing lines (aie)(bgf )(chd)
(dg)(eh)( fi )
adeh 1 1 9T8=S 23 (adg)(beh)(cfi) 10,080
(aie)(bgf )(chd)
(dg)(eh)( fi )
(ag)(bi)(ch)(ef )
aefg 1 1 9T13 (adg)(beh)(cfi) 6,720
dghi (aie)(bgf )(chd)
(afi )(bdg)(ceh)
(bc)(ef )(hi )
abfi 1 1 9T16=C 23_D18 (abc)(def )( ghi) 5,040
(bdcg)( fihe)
(dg)(eh)( fi )
aefg 1 1 9T18 (adg)(beh)(cfi) 3,360
(aie)(bgf )(chd)
(ag)(bi)(ch)(ef )
(afi )(bdg)(ceh)
bdef 1 1 9T28 (abc), (bc) 560
(abc)(def ), (ef )(hi )
( ghi ), (hi )
(adg)(beh)(cfi)
bcde Dem23 1 1 9T31=S3 " S3 (abc), (bc) 280
(adg)(beh)(cfi )
(dg)(eh)( fi )
abcde Dem9 9 9 9T34=S9 (abcdefghi ) 1
(ab)
Total 570,361
of minimal winning coalitions. There are other minimal winning coalitions,
namely [b, c, d, g, i], [a, b, c, f, i], [a, b, c, h, i] and their orbits under the
action of 9T8. However, only minimal winning coalitions containing at most
half the number of voters are listed. Given the winning minority coalitions,
the winning majority coalitions are simply those majority coalitions whose
complement is losing.
Due to space constraints, the transitive MIFs with symmetry 9T1, 9T3,
and 9T4 are listed in Figs. 35.
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FIG. 3. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=9T1 (cyclic symmetry).
v In Fig. 3, orbits are represented up to rotation by an oriented cycle
(aehbficdg). (This oriented cycle is used instead of (abcdefghi ) in order to con-
form to the standard notation given in [19].)
For each isomorphism class of maximal intersecting families of sets with the
indicated group of symmetries, one MIF is depicted by representing its orbits
(under the action of the group) of minimal winning coalitions containing at
most half of the elements of X. The complete MIF can then be reconstituted
by symmetry, inclusion, and duality.
v In Fig. 4, orbits are represented up to rotation and flip by an unorien-
ted cycle.
FIG. 4. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=9T3 (dihedral symmetry).
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FIG. 5. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=9T4 (toroidal symmetry, oriented in one direction,
but not in the other).
v In Fig. 5, orbits are represented by a ‘‘tic-tac-toe’’ graph drawn on
a torus, up to rotation along both axes, and reflection about the vertical
axis. (It is understood that edges going off one edge of the diagram reappear
on the other side.)
v In Fig. 6, the orbit [C] in the MIF mentioned above is represented
by a ‘‘tic-tac-toe’’ graph drawn on a torus, up to rotation and reflection
about both axes.
v In Fig. 7, orbits are represented by the complete symmetry group of
the ‘‘tic-tac-toe’’ graph. When drawn on the torus, this includes rotation
and reflection about both axes and exchange of axes.
4.4.2. Composition. Given a MIF F on n voters, and n MIFs G1 , ..., Gn
on disjoint sets of voters X1 , ..., Xn , respectively. Then one can define the
composition of F with G1 , ..., Gn to be the set of subsets A of X=
X1 _ } } } _ Xn such that [i : A & Xi # Gi] # F. In other words, F[G1 , ..., Gn]
is the voting scheme in which the voters vote by committee. Each committee
votes according to its own rules Gi , and results are combined via the voting
scheme F.
If F is a transitive game on n voters, and G is a transitive game on m
voters, then
F[G, ..., G
n
]
is a transitive game on nm voters. (This is essentially the proof of part 2 of
Theorem 5 given by Cameron, Frankl, and Kantor [5].)
Proposition 11 [17]. Let S, T1 , ..., Tn be strong simple games. If
S[T1 , ..., Tn] is transitive, then S is also transitive, and the games T1 , ..., Tn
must all be isomorphic transitive strong simple games.
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FIG. 6. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=9T8 (unoriented toroidal symmetry).
FIG. 7. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=9T16 (total toroidal symmetry).
TABLE VIII
List of Transitive MIFs: Part III (n=10)
MWC t t$ Aut(F) Generators *
See Figure 5 1 1 10T7=A5 (bf )(ce)(dg)(ij ) 16_60,480
16 missing lines (aeg)(bid )(chj )
See Figure 9 for 1 1 10T8 (ab)(cd) 10_45,360
10 missing lines (acegi )(bdfhj )
dghij, abefh 2 2 10T26=L(2, 9) (abc)(def )( ghi ) 10,080
(bdcg)(efih)
abefh, abfi 2 2 10T26=L(2, 9) (abc)(def )( ghi ) 10,080
(bdcg)(efih)
Total 1,441,440
FIG. 8. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=10T7.
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FIG. 9. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=10T8.
In fact, the symmetries of such a composition Aut(S[T, T, ..., T]) is
given by the wreath product Aut(S) "Aut(T ), since each committee can be
permuted by Aut(T ) or the committee can be permuted with each other by
Aut(S).
Thus, Dem23=Dem3[Dem3 , Dem3 , Dem3] is a simply transitive MIF on
9 voters with Aut(Dem23)=S3 "S3 .
All MIFs can be expressed as trivial compositions
F=Dem1[F]
=F[Dem1 , ..., Dem1]
TABLE IX
List of Transitive MIFs: Part IV (n=11)
MWC Name t t$ Aut(F) Generators *
57,196 missing lines 1 1 11T1=C11 (abcdefghijk) 57,196_3,628,800
See Figure 10 for 1 1 11T2=D22 (abcdefghijk) 43_1,814,400
48 missing lines (bk)(cj)(di )(eh)( fg)
See Figure 11 for 1 2 11T3=C5_C11 (abcdefghijk) 11_725,760
11 missing lines (befjd )(cikhg)
bcdfg 1 2 11T4=C10_C11 (abcdefghijk) 2_362,880
(bceifkjhdg)
bdefh 1 2 11T4=C10_C11 (abcdefghijk) 2_362,880
(bceifkjhdg)
abefh 2 4 11T6=M11 (abc)(def )( ghi ) 5040
(bdcg)(efih)
(aj)(dg)(ef )(hi)
(dh)(ei)( fg)( jk)
abcdef Dem11 11 11 11T8=S11 (abcdefghijk) 1
(ab)
Total 207,688,650,161
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FIG. 10. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=11T2.
FIG. 11. Transitive MIFs: Aut(F)=11T3.
404 LOEB AND CONWAY
FIG. 12. Lattice of orbits G=9T4.
405VOTING FAIRLY
involving a single ‘‘committee’’ or a large number of one-person ‘‘committees.’’
A MIF is said to be prime if it cannot be expressed as a composition
F[G1 , ..., Gn] in any other way [17].
Proposition 12 [17]. All 2-transitive strong-simple games are prime
strong-simple games. K
4.5. n=10
Transitive MIFs for n=10 are tabulated in Table VIII. (See Table V for
legend.) As we saw before in the case of Icos (for n=6), an even number
of voters is not necessarily a barrier to the existence of a transitive MIF.
In fact, there are even 12 classes of transitive MIFs with at least one winning
minority coalition.
Due to space constraints, the transitive MIFs with symmetries 10T7 and
10T8 are listed in Figs. 8 and 9. They are classified according to how many
minority winning coalition they include (4 elements).
4.6. n=11
Transitive MIFs for n=11 are tabulated in Table IX. (See Table V for
legend.)
Due to space constraints, the 57,196 isomorphism classes of transitive
MIFs with symmetry 11T1 have been omitted. They each have 11-fold
cyclic symmetry.
Transitive MIFs with symmetries 11T2 and 11T3 are listed in Figs. 10
and 11, respectively.
In Fig. 12, orbits are represented by an unoriented cycle up to rotation
and reflection.
5. SEARCH TECHNIQUES
In this section, we give details concerning our computer search for tran-
sitive MIFs. We believe that other symmetrical combinatorial structures
can be enumerated by similar techniques. For example, McKay and others
[19, 20, 27] have enumerated graphs with vertex transitive automorphism
groups and up to 26 vertices.
5.1. Tree Search
We first identified and eliminated the transitive groups which were
liable to be the automorphism group of some MIF. We began with the
catalog of transitive groups of degree up to 11 by Butler and McKay [4].
(For 11<n23, one can use the program Gap. For n=25 or 26, see
A. Hulpke [28].) Groups which contained a fixed-point free 2-element
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were then identified by using the table of group elements according to
cyclic decomposition type.
A program was written in Caml Special Light (CSL) [12] that
given a group G would generate the set SG of all MIFs F with GAut(F).
To do this, the computer calculated the orbits of the action of G on the power-
set of X by applying the generators of G repeatedly to the subsets of X. Given
an orbit :, define its dual :* to be the orbit generated by [X"A], where A # :.
We never have :=:* since G is assumed to contain no fixed-point free
2-elements. There is no point in studying such groups as they are not the
automorphism groups of any MIF. For each pair (:, :*) we must decide
whether : or :* will be in our MIF.
We write :; if there is some A # : and B # ; such that BA. (See
Fig. 12.) If ::*, then : is a subset of every MIF in SG .
Our main algorithm considers an orbit :=[A], where A has minimal
cardinality among those orbits still under consideration. If ::*, then :
must be rejected and :* must be included as above. Otherwise, we either
reject : and accept :*, or else we accept : and we reject all orbits ;:*.
In both cases, a recursive call to the algorithm allows us to determine the
possible ways to treat the remaining orbits.
If only the number of solutions |SG | is required, then a dynamic program-
ming algorithm can be used by creating a hash table (remember table)
and using it to treat most of the recursive calls. Using a 50-Mb table, and
taking advantage of the obvious 8-fold symmetry, we were able to compute
all 8-voter MIFs in only 12 min. whereas an analogous algorithm by Bioch
and Ibarki [3] required 6 months.
5.2. InclusionExclusion
The set SG includes all MIFs with at least the group G as symmetry. To
compute the number of MIFs with exactly the group G as symmetry,
inclusionexclusion techniques (Mo bius inversion) are required.
Sn acts on its subgroups by conjugation. Given a permutation group
GSn , let Z$(G ) denote its stabilizer under this action Z$(G )=[_ # Sn :
_G=G_]. Z$(G ) includes the center Z(G ) (and in fact G itself) but also
possibly other elements since we require not that _ commute with each
element of G but simply that _ commute with G itself. Thus, there are
n!|Z$(G )| conjugate copies of the group G in Sn .
By restricting this action to a group H (GHSn), the stabilizer is
Z$(G) & H. We thus deduce that there are |H ||Z$(G ) & H | conjugate copies
of the group G in H.
For each pair of groups (G, H ) under consideration for which we found
at least one nondemocratic MIF, we calculated |Z$(G ) & H | using a short
program in CSL. The generators of G were conjugated the generators of H.
The result was then compared to a list of elements of G.
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Since the n!|Z$(H )| copies of H contain |H ||Z$(G ) & H | copies of G
and there are n!|Z$(G)| copies of G, it then follows that each conjugate
copy of G is contained in exactly
MGH=
n!
|Z$(H)|
_
|H |
|Z$(G) & H |<
n!
|Z$(G )|
=
|H |_|Z$(G )|
|Z$(H)|_|Z$(G ) & H |
copies of H.
Proposition 13. Given the unitriangular matrix M above and the vector
v (vG=|SG | ), indexed by certain subgroups of Sn , we have the identity
v=Mw, (1)
where wG is the number of MIF F with Aut(F)=G.
Proof.
vG= :
F # SG
1
= :
GAut(F)
1
= :
GH
:
H=Aut(F)
1
=MGHwH . K
Using the Maple linalg package, we solved (1) for w. For example,
in the case n=11 (see Table IX), we solved
_
572227
&=_
1 1 1 1 2 1
& w
243 0 1 0 1 0 1
27 0 0 1 1 2 1
3 0 0 0 1 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
to find w=[571960, 240, 22, 2, 1, 1]T.
Among the vG MIFs we found with symmetry at least G, there are wG
with symmetry exactly G. However, some of these may be isomorphic.
Proposition 14. The MIFs with automorphism group G are divided into
wG |G||Z$(G)| isomorphism classes each of size |Z$(G )||G|.
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Proof. Let Aut(F)=G. The n!|G| isomorphic images _F of F have
automorphism groups Aut(_F)=_G_&1 which are conjugates of G. There
are n!|Z$(G)| conjugates of G which are all identical up to permutations
of X. Thus, there are |Z$(G )||G| isomorphic images of F with auto-
morphism group exactly equal to G. K
Dividing by the appropriate quantities we know, for example, that
the group 11T1 is the automorphism group of 57,196 collections of 10
isomorphic MIFs.
5.3. Statistics
To identify the various isomorphism classes, we used a collection of Maple
routines to apply various statistics (invariant under permutation of X ) to
the MIFs generated. Typical statistics included:
v The distribution of winning coalitions according to coalition size.
v The distribution of minimal winning coalitions according to coalition
size.
v The set of numbers cj (t$< jn), where cj is the number of winning
coalitions containing 1, 2, 3, ..., t$ and j, and t$ is the homogeneity of the
group.
In a handful of cases, no easily computed statistic could distinguish
certain isomorphism classes. In those cases, coset representatives were
found for the quotient Z$(G )G using the cosets function in the Maple
group package. By applying these permutations to these MIFs using the
procedure subs, we were able to compute the isomorphism classes as they
are simply the orbits of the action of Z$(G ) on these MIFs.
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